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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We are writing these notes shortly after returning from a two-week trip to Mexico where both of us gave lectures on imperialism at the National University in Mexico City. Other lecturers in the same series, under the auspices of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, were Miguel Wionczek of the University of Mexico, Theotonio Dos Santos of the University of Chile, Michael Klare of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), and Richard Barnett of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Harry Magdoff spoke on "Imperialism: History and Theory" and Paul Sweezy on "Imperialism in the 1970s." We also conducted seminars at the School of Economics, Magdoff on the international monetary crisis and Sweezy on the concept of the economic surplus. The reception from both faculty and students was very warm and friendly. There has been and still is a great deal of political repression in Mexico in recent years. But one thing is certain: no amount of repression can crush the revolutionary and anti-imperialist spirit of broad masses of the Mexican people. We came away from Mexico with the conviction that this spirit will find new and increasingly effective ways of expressing itself in the months and years ahead.

It is of course much too early to give an overall assessment of the response to the "Announcement" published in the February issue about MR's troublesome financial problems. But we can say that the initial reaction was very gratifying indeed. MR Associates income (from regular new

(Continued on inside cover)

CARS AND CITIES

By Paul M. Sweezy

"Cities, after all, have a great deal in common with cars. More and more, in fact, they often seem to be turning into cars. There are deep mysteries here, impenetrable to the present shallow state of human understanding. Somehow, we know not how, things communicate."

— Russell Baker,
New York Times, March 8, 1973

In Marxist theory the treatment of technology has generally referred to production, the means of production, the character of the labor process, and related matters. This follows the example set by Marx himself in his justly famous chapter on machinery and modern industry in Volume 1 of *Capital* which occurs in the Part devoted to the production of relative surplus value. Neither there nor anywhere else in *Capital* is there any discussion or analysis of the impact of technology on consumption and via consumption on processes of capital accumulation and social development.

The reason for this is not that Marx excluded consumption from a role in the capitalist process. On the contrary, in the well-known "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy,"

This essay was written for and will be published in Volume 12 of *Iwanami Lectures on Contemporary Urban Policy* (in Japanese) under the editorship of Professor Tokue Shibata, who has written for MONTHLY REVIEW in the past and is now a special assistant to the Socialist governor of Tokyo.

Marx wrote:¹ "Definite production thus determines definite consumption, distribution, exchange and *definite relations among these different elements*. To be sure production, *in its one-sided form*, is in its turn also determined by the other elements. For example, if the market, i.e., the sphere of exchange, expands, production grows and becomes further subdivided." It is evident from this and other passages in the Introduction that Marx regarded production and consumption as dialectically inter-related aspects of a single complex process. As in all such cases, change initiated in any part can in principle—though it does not necessarily have to—ramify throughout the whole, setting in motion either self-limiting or cumulative sequences of change. Marx provided a classic description and analysis of a cumulative sequence of change within the production process in a beautiful passage which begins: "A radical change in the mode of production in one sphere of industry involves a similar change in other spheres."²

The fact that Marx failed to analyze any such sequences involving both production and consumption did not arise from any denial that they might exist, or even that they actually did exist. In discussing the consequences of machinery, he wrote:

The immediate result of machinery is to augment surplus value and the mass of products in which surplus value is embodied. And, as the substances consumed by the capitalists and their dependents become more plentiful, so too do these orders of society. Their growing wealth, and the relatively diminished number of workmen required to produce the necessities of life beget, simultaneously with the rise of new and luxurious wants, the means of satisfying those wants. A larger proportion of the produce of society is changed into surplus produce, and a larger part of the surplus produce is supplied for consumption in a multiplicity of refined shapes. In other words, the production of luxuries increases.³

1. The Introduction in question was first published by Kautsky in 1903 and is not to be confused with the Preface to the 1859 work *The Critique of Political Economy*. It is actually the Introduction to the *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf)*, which was not published in full until 1939. The quotation is from the East German edition of 1953, p. 20.

2. *Capital*, Vol. 1 (Kerr ed.), pp. 418-422.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 486.

Here was a clear example of an interaction of production and consumption resulting from technological change, one which from some points of view was certainly far from insignificant. The reason why Marx noted it only in passing and made no attempt to analyze it in depth, as he did with the consequences of machinery in the production process itself, was probably because he saw it as affecting only the consumption patterns of the capitalists and their dependents. As far as the working class was concerned, he believed that the capitalistic use of machinery had had disastrous consequences, ruining handicraftsmen and lowering the wages of factory hands by simplifying their work and opening the way for the mass employment of women and children. By comparison, the stimulation of luxury consumption by the capitalist class was a matter of secondary importance which not only could but should be abstracted from in studying the *modus operandi* of the capitalist system.

In the century since the publication of the first volume of *Capital*, however, it is clear that technological changes affecting both production and consumption *and* involving fundamental alterations in the consumption patterns of the mass of workers, with far-reaching consequences for the functioning of capitalism, have occurred in the advanced imperialist metropolises of the global capitalist system.⁴ What is at issue here is what may be called the political economy of the motor car which, so far as I am aware, has never been subjected to serious analysis in the Marxian literature.

In the beginning the automobile was of course a mere curiosity, but developed rapidly into a luxury good entering into the consumption of the upper class. "As long as motor cars were few in number," Lewis Mumford wrote, "he who had one was a king; he could go where he pleased and halt where he pleased; and this machine itself appeared as a compensatory device for enlarging an ego which had been shrunken by our very success in mechanization."⁵ This was clearly the situation which ob-

4. In these notes I am drawing exclusively on my personal experience and acquired knowledge of conditions in the United States. But I believe that what is said applies, in the main, to the other imperialist centers in Western Europe and Japan.

5. Quoted in William V. Shannon, "The Untrustworthy Highway Fund," *The New York Times Magazine* (October 15, 1972), p. 121.

tained before the First World War: in 1910 there were some 19,000 people for every car in the United States.⁶ During the next decade, however, the automobile began to enter into popular consumption, the ratio of people to cars dropping precipitously to approximately 11 to 1 by 1920. On the side of technology and production, the decisive factor here was Henry Ford's introduction of the low-priced Model T, involving (as both cause and effect) such cost-reducing technologies as the assembly line and interchangeable parts.

Since 1920 the people/car ratio has further declined as follows: 1930—4.5; 1940—4.1; 1950—3.1; 1960—2.4; 1970—1.9. At the present time, in other words, there are more than half as many cars as people in the United States. The automobile has become a mass-consumption commodity in the fullest sense of the term. And in the process it has profoundly altered many aspects of social existence for all classes and strata of society.

The most obvious manifestations of this process—which the late Paul Baran and I have called the “automobilization” of society⁷—are traffic congestion and pollution, and these are also the effects which have been most instrumental in focusing public attention on the social and environmental implications of automobilization. But congestion and pollution are essentially superficial phenomena, comparable to the outward symptoms of a disease with deep roots in the organs of the body. If we are ever to deal with the disease itself we must go beyond the symptoms and study its etiology. In the present instance what we need first of all is to understand the ways in which the automobile in the process of becoming a mass-consumption good impinged upon and ultimately transformed the geography and demography of the country.

Before the automobile age there was a sharp physical division between city and country. The city was a clearly bounded built-up area beyond which there was country (or in some directions a body of water). People who worked in the city but lived

6. Unless otherwise stated, all figures come from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, various years.

7. *Monopoly Capital* (Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 241 and *passim*.

outside of it had to rely on transportation by rail for getting in and out. With the railroads limited to providing station-to-station service and readily accessible only from relatively short distances on both sides of the tracks, the areas available for suburban settlement were quite restricted. They were for the most part inhabited by upper-income people and those who catered to their needs, providing for a quantitatively small sector of the bourgeoisie many of the advantages of country living in close proximity to the urban centers.⁸

The coming of the automobile as such did not change this situation. In the early years cars were expensive and unreliable so that only the well-to-do could afford them and their upkeep. In addition, except for city and town streets, roads were few and bad. Under these circumstances as far as the suburbs were concerned, cars complemented the existing patterns rather than changing them. Owned by the upper-income commuters and largely chauffeur-driven (the chauffeur fulfilling the role of mechanic as well as driver at a time when repair and service stations were all but nonexistent), cars expanded the area within which commuters could conveniently live but introduced no new elements into the picture. The 1920s saw the beginning of an extremely complex cumulative process, culminating in what it has become usual to refer to as today's "urban crisis." The immediately propelling forces underlying this process were, first, the cheapening of the automobile; and second, the extension of the road and highway network.

On the production side, the development of the automobile and the automobile industry provides a classic illustration of the laws of capitalist accumulation. Originally consisting of hun-

8. I grew up in a suburb of this kind. Several years before the First World War my family moved from New York to a suburb across the Hudson River in New Jersey. Our house was around a mile in one direction from the town and the railroad station, about as far away as the commuters then lived. In the other direction, between our house and the River (which, except for the underwater Hudson Tube between lower Manhattan and the Newark/Jersey City urban area, could only be crossed by ferry in those days), there was more than a mile of untouched woodland. The spread of the automobile and the building of the George Washington Bridge across the Hudson totally transformed the region and its relation to the city in the manner analyzed in the text.

dreds of small shops, mostly formerly carriage-makers, using essentially handicraft methods, the industry was rapidly mechanized and concentrated in a few large firms. In the process new technologies were pioneered; and new forms and strategies of organization and management were devised. The Ford Motor Company, under the sole control of the first Henry Ford, was the perfect example of what Marx called concentration of capital, expanding entirely through investing its own profits. General Motors, on the other hand, also illustrates the centralization of capital in Marx's sense, i.e., the combination of a number of separate enterprises into one, a pattern likewise followed by Chrysler and American Motors, the other two still surviving U.S. firms in the industry. During the fiercely competitive stage of the industry's development, up to the early 1920s, prices declined in step with costs. As an example, when the Model T Ford was introduced in 1908 its price was \$1,000; by 1924 it had fallen to less than \$300, i.e., by more than 70 percent.⁹ During the same period per capita national income in current prices more than doubled (from an average of about \$300 in 1908 to \$660 in 1924).¹⁰ Obviously the result of these changes was to open up a vast new market for automobiles during this crucial decade and a half: the total number of passenger vehicles registered in 1910 was about a half million and this had increased fortyfold to 20 million by 1925.¹¹

All these cars would have had no place to go, however, had it not been for a vast increase in the road network. As a very rough indicator of what was happening here, the mileage of surfaced roads increased by 81 percent between 1910 and 1920, by 88 percent between 1920 and 1930, and by 97 percent be-

9. David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 442.

10. Calculated from *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1957* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2nd Printing, 1961), pp. 7, 139. The figure for 1908 is not exactly comparable to that for 1924 since the relevant National Income is the average for the years 1907-1911.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 462.

tween 1930 and 1940.¹² At the same time of course the quality and carrying capacity of the roads were greatly improved. In recent years, indeed, it has been mainly through the upgrading of roads or the construction of multilane freeways paralleling or replacing existing routes that the capacity of the highway network has been expanded.

It should not be supposed that all this has taken place in a smooth and continuous process. The dominant dynamic force has of course been the mass production and sale of new cars, rising from around two million in 1920 to eight million or more in the last few years (excluding truck, buses, and imports). But since cars last up to ten years or more, the number on the road, distributed in large part through the used-car market, cumulatively increased to nearly 90 million by 1970; and it is the total number of vehicles rather than new sales which generates pressure on the highways. This pressure has made itself felt unevenly and has been responded to by various governmental units at the local, state, and federal levels even more unevenly. At some times and places traffic has built up far beyond the capacity of the available roads, creating bottlenecks and intensifying pressures on the authorities; and at other times and places building has outstripped the growth of traffic, only to be overtaken in turn by the inexorable build-up of more cars and more traffic.

The foregoing account of the interaction between cars and roads is descriptive in nature and fails to convey a sense of the enormous power of the economic forces which have driven the process forward, especially in the last 25 years since the recovery of the automobile industry from the almost complete shutdown forced upon it during the Second World War. The private interests which cluster around and are directly or indirectly dependent upon the automobile for their prosperity are quantitatively far more numerous and wealthy than those similarly related to any other commodity or complex of commodities in the U.S. economy. Here is a quick run-down.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 458. The increase was down to 42 percent for the decade of the 1940s owing to the drastic curtailment of new construction during the Second World War, and comparable figures do not appear to be available for 1960 and 1970.

(1) The automobile industry itself. The first, third, and seventh corporations on *Fortune's* list of the 500 largest are automobile producers, and the industry as a whole is easily the most profitable in the economy.¹³

(2) Manufacturing industries largely dependent on the automobile. Three more of the largest ten on the *Fortune* list (nos. 2, 6, and 8) are oil companies. And by one researcher's count, altogether 22 of the 50 largest (including the auto and oil companies already listed) "are in automobiles and highways for the bulk of their income."¹⁴

(3) Service industries largely dependent on the automobile. Here we include dealers, wholesalers of vehicles and parts, gasoline stations, and all sorts of garage and repair facilities. In 1967 there were about a half million establishments under these headings employing over two million employees. If we assume that in most cases the proprietors also work, we would conclude that something over 3 percent of the total labor force is employed in directly servicing automobiles. And this does not count the numerous categories of employment, such as motels and resorts, which are almost as dependent, albeit indirectly.

(4) Users of highways for profit. After a rapid process of centralization, there were 1,250 intercity trucking companies in 1968, employing nearly a half million workers and carrying around 20 percent of the country's long-distance freight. At the same time the Teamsters Union, which is the largest union in the country with a membership of more than 1,700,000, is centered in the fields of trucking and warehousing. In addition of course most big corporations have their own fleets of trucks. And there are other types of commercial highway users such as buses (urban and intercity) and taxicabs.

13. A ranking of U.S. manufacturing industries by ten-year average rate of return on capital (for the decade 1949-1958) shows Motor Vehicles and Parts first with 28.2 percent, while the second ranked industry trails with 23.2 percent. B. C. Minhas, *An International Comparison of Factor Costs and Factor Use* (Department of Economics, Stanford University, 1960), p. 80.

14. John Jerome, *The Death of the Automobile* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 112. The title of Jerome's book, for better or worse, reflects wishful thinking more than fact, actual or prospective.

(5) Makers of highways, including an important segment of the construction industry (about 11 percent of the total measured by value added in 1968) and a large number (about 600,000 in 1969) of government workers (federal, state, and local) employed in the planning, supervising, maintaining, and repairing of highways.

(6) Last but not least is the automobile-driving public (in 1968 there were 101 million registered motor vehicles of all kinds and 105 million licensed drivers). Though the increasingly severe problems of congestion and pollution are now causing many of the country's motorists to have second thoughts, it is nevertheless true that through the whole period of automobilization from 1910 right up through the 1960s, they felt more or less continuously restrained and frustrated by an inadequate road and highway network. They therefore provided massive and enthusiastic political support for road-building, culminating in the launching in 1956 by the federal government of the multi-billion-dollar Interstate Highway System, backed by a device called the Highway Trust Fund which ensured that all federal taxes collected on motor vehicles, gasoline, and related equipment would be used to construct a vast system of superhighways.¹⁵

15. The following passage from John Jerome's lively study, cited in the previous footnote, illustrates the change in the public attitude toward road-building which is now under way. Back in 1956, he points out, the road-builders exulted in the magnitude of their works: "How the press releases rolled! Four hundred square miles of pavement! One and a half million acres of new right of way! Excavations to bury Connecticut knee deep. Sand, gravel, and stone to build a wall around the world fifty feet wide and nine feet high. Concrete enough for six sidewalks to the moon. . . . [B]y 1971, local lawsuits or local government action had halted the construction of Interstate projects in fifteen major American cities. . . . It had become virtually impossible to gain acceptance for a new Interstate in any urban area, and many rural segments of the plan . . . were in trouble. . . . The sea change in the American mood is precisely characterized by the Bureau of Roads' press releases. When the Interstate was initiated, consumption of a million and a half acres of right of way or four hundred square miles of forest was fit material for boasting; now it has become a shameful admission." *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106. This changing public attitude doubtless portends other significant changes in the period ahead. This is a subject, however, which falls outside the scope of the present essay.

This bare listing of the main components of what may be called the automobile-industrial complex could, and in any thorough study should, be complemented by an analysis of its structure and *modus operandi*. Here it must suffice to note that these various interests are represented by a large number of trade associations and other organizations which are amply financed and staffed and are active on a full-time basis at all levels of government as well as in the realm of propaganda and opinion formation. As Jerome puts it, "The scurry work, the wheedling and coercion, the swapping of favors and collection of political debts, is done by a large and complexly interwoven network of associations and pressure groups."¹⁶ As would be expected, in other words, the enormous economic wealth and power of the automobile-industrial complex have been effectively mobilized and brought to bear at the political and ideological levels.

Let us now turn to the impact of automobilization on the development of cities and the living patterns of their inhabitants. Decisive in this connection has been the obliteration of the old sharp dividing line between city and country. Drive from the center of an American city today in any direction, and you will of course eventually come to open country. But you will never cross a boundary clearly demarcating the one from the other. What you will observe instead is a gradual thinning out of the density of settlement. The old distinctive commuter suburb dependent on rail transport has been swallowed up and incorporated into an expanded urban area.¹⁷ And in some places, particularly in the northeast between Boston and Washington, expanding urban areas or metropolises have run into each other.¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

17. It is true that what are now sometimes called exurbs, lying 50 miles or more from the city center, have some of the characteristics of the older type suburbs. But there are no structural features such as were imposed by dependence on rail transport which protect them from being swallowed up in their turn. This indeed seems likely to be their ultimate fate as long as population continues to grow and there is no basic change in the socio-economic system.

18. The Boston-Washington region—which includes New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, as well as a number of lesser but still large cities—has been subjected to intensive study by the French geographer Jean Gott-

In such cases your trip from one city center will take you through roughly concentric rings of *decreasing* density into another set of concentric rings of *increasing* density.

This obliteration of the old distinctions between city, country, and suburb—often called “urban sprawl”—would have been impossible but for the automobile which, with its complementary road and highway network, has introduced what may be called a generalized factor of mobility replacing the former limited and specific modes of mobility. The car can go in any direction for any distance. The horse-drawn vehicle, on the other hand, is necessarily short-haul, and both railroads and trolleys are track-bound and therefore restricted to certain prescribed routes. These specific modes of mobility impose a definite shape on both economy and society, much as a skeleton may be said to impose a shape on a living body. With the coming of the generalized factor of mobility, these constraints are removed and radically new locational patterns become possible.

They become possible, but no particular new pattern is dictated or enforced. What actually happens is therefore determined by other considerations. And here we must, I think, give primacy to the overall process of capital accumulation which both seeks out and responds to profitable investment opportunities on the one hand, and creates new ones on the other. The point is that with greater freedom of mobility, the shape of economy and society could adjust to the pushes and pulls of the accumulation process more rapidly and completely than would otherwise have been the case. And the likelihood of cumulative rather than self-limiting processes of change was greatly increased. Moreover, the possibility existed and was soon translated into reality that cumulative change, once initiated, would take on a life of its own, often contradicting rather than serving the economic and social needs which had given rise to it in the first place.

mann (*Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*, New York, 1961). Gottmann naturally has to deal with the automobile in many contexts, but he appears not to be aware of its decisive role in the dynamics of the process under study, a fact which is perhaps best explained by the book's total lack of any coherent theoretical framework.

Automobilization started somewhat later, but in the main coincided with the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. The emerging corporate giants, including those directly or indirectly dependent on the automobile, were more profitable than their predecessors and were therefore able to grow more rapidly than the smaller and more competitive sectors of the economy (Marx's concentration of capital); and their huge financial resources gave them the leverage to engineer an uninterrupted series of mergers (Marx's centralization of capital). Technologically, this increasingly dominant monopolistic sector of the economy was (and is) highly dynamic, manifesting a strong bias toward more and more sophisticated, capital-intensive methods of production. Moreover, the big monopolies, in their search for new markets, have made available to other sectors of the economy advanced mechanical, electronic, chemical and other sophisticated technologies which in turn have revolutionized these sectors' methods of production. What is particularly relevant from our present point of view is that in this way U.S. agriculture, in spite of the fact that it does not readily lend itself to monopolization, has been rapidly mechanized and chemicalized, leading to the relative depopulation of the countryside and the crowding of displaced farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural laborers into the cities. As a result of this internal migration as well as of natural population growth, the cities have experienced very rapid expansion during the automobilization period. (In the half century from 1910 to 1960, the urban population increased from 42 million to 125 million, approximately 300 percent; while the rural population increased 50 to 54 million, or only 8 percent.)

Urban growth on this scale would have involved a comparable increase in the geographical size of cities even if the new residential areas had been of the built-up, high-density variety. But given the general mobility factor introduced by the automobile, the urban-sprawl pattern, involving a much more than proportional increase in area, became both a possibility and a reality. Where in earlier times the children of slum-dwelling immigrants had, as they climbed the economic ladder, moved into compact neighborhoods within the built-up city, now the tendency was increasingly to move to the fringes and

the formerly railroad-dependent suburbs. The slums in turn were filled up no longer by immigrants from abroad (the First World War effectively put an end to this kind of immigration) but by those expelled from U.S. agriculture, including disproportionately large numbers of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans.

And now comes the final act in what may be called the drama of the car and the city. The massive outflow of population from the old inner city brings with it much more than a mere change in residential patterns. As people move out, all sorts of economic activities move with them, and a process of obsolescence and decay is initiated in the center. First to follow the population movement of course are retail and service establishments. But these are soon joined by manufacturers and wholesalers who on the one hand now find a labor supply and cheaper land on the outskirts and on the other hand are repelled by the deterioration in the center. The movement of residences comes first, but the movement of jobs soon reinforces the movement of residences, which in turn stimulates further movement of jobs, and so on in a self-reproducing cumulative process.

It might be supposed that this would result in a more or less even and continuous settlement of the space occupied by the outward movement, with densities declining in direct proportion to distance from the center, so that there would after all be a reasonably clear demarcation between built-up area and open space beyond. But this is not the way it happens in a regime of private property in land such as that which obtains in the United States. Typically, large amounts of land are held off the market and out of use by investors (or, if you prefer, speculators), as a result of which the development process often has to leapfrog over areas of open land.¹⁹ And in addition densities are kept down by zoning ordinances prescribing minimum sizes for residential lots in parts of the metropolis, usually farther out, controlled by upper- and middle-income whites determined to exclude the poor and the black from their neighbor-

19. In the language of North American urban planners, "developed" land is that which is actually used for any urban purpose (including parks), while all other land within the urban area is "open" or "undeveloped."

hoods. The consequence is that the city comes to sprawl over an area much greater than mobility and economic factors alone would dictate. By now, according to Hans Blumenfeld, "the overall density of American urban areas is about one fifth to one sixth of the density prevailing a century ago, when walking was the predominant mode of transportation."²⁰

This means that an enormous amount of transportation of goods and people has to take place day in and day out just to keep the life of the city going. Much of this is commuting in the traditional sense of the term, i.e., movement of people living in the outskirts to and from work in the city center (this obviously creates all sorts of special problems because it is concentrated in a few hours in the morning and evening). But much more in the aggregate is of a different character: goods being supplied to economic units scattered all over the urban area; children going to and from school; shoppers getting to retail outlets and back home again; people getting together for social purposes; and a new and increasingly important kind of commuting, i.e., the going to and from jobs by workers who both live and work in the outskirts, which may involve relatively short trips in the same section but also may involve long trips from a section on one side of the city across the center to another section on the other side (with all possible variations in between). Except in the case of traditional commuting, which lends itself very well to the use of public transportation, almost all of this movement now takes place by private automobile. An impressionistic notion of how vast the volume of travel by private automobile has become can perhaps be derived from the following two items culled from recent issues of the *New York Times*: (1) According to a Gallup Poll, 81 percent of all American workers travel to and from work by automobile. (May 30, 1971); (2) The Associated Press reports that "American housewives average about 100 miles each week just in family chauffeuring and errands around town." (January 23, 1973). With the number of cars, the urban population, and the area

20. Hans Blumenfeld, "Criteria for Judging the Quality of the Urban Environment," *The Canadian Architect* (November, 1972), p. 47.

of sprawl all steadily expanding, it is no wonder that pollution and congestion are coming to be experienced as the manifestations of an acute urban crisis;²¹ or that the general factor of mobility which the automobile was in its golden age is increasingly turning into its opposite.

One final point needs to be made in this highly sketchy survey of the interrelation and interaction between the car and the city. When we speak of traditional commuting (outskirts to city center and back), we are talking primarily about a small number of cities which are both big and also old in the sense that they had railroad-dependent suburbs in the pre-automobile age—chief among them New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and San Francisco. In addition, these are cities with highly developed business centers not directly related to production, embracing national or regional corporate headquarters, banking and insurance, shipping offices, and so on. While there has been considerable outward movement of such functions, on the whole the advantages of keeping them together, in a compact area within which rapid face-to-face communication is easily maintained, are so great that these central business areas have grown with the overall growth of the metropolis. As a consequence, too, other economic and cultural activities which are encompassed in the concept of “downtown”—hotels and restaurants, theaters and concert halls, museums, elegant department stores and specialty shops—have survived and even flourished.

Where these conditions are found, the city retains much of its traditional structure and character, despite the ubiquitous sprawl and the decaying slums and ghettos between downtown and the outer residential areas. But where these conditions are not found or are found in a relatively undeveloped form—and this is the case with most cities which have experienced most of their growth during the automobile age—there has been a strong tendency for the old urban structure to break down and a new one without historic precedent to take its place. The

21. This is without taking into account the social and environmental pathology of the decaying inner city.

process of sprawl has brought with it a decentralization of most of the functions usually associated with downtown, with resultant emergence of a multiplicity of subcenters, each offering some of the services of downtown—shopping areas, branch banks, motels, restaurants, cinemas—but without any of its character or magnetism. When this stage has been reached, the city as a meaningfully organized and structured form of civilized living has disappeared in favor of an amorphous aggregate of people, dwellings, cars, roads, and economic units jumbled together in a more or less continuous and potentially ever-expanding geographical area. Los Angeles is the obvious prototype of this kind of urban area. It was vividly characterized as long ago as 1959, in a perceptive series of articles by Harrison Salisbury in the *New York Times*, as follows:

Here, nestled under its blanket of smog, girdled by bands of freeways, its core eviscerated by concrete strips and asphalt fields, its circulatory arteries pumping away without focus, lies the prototype of Gasopolis, the rubber-wheeled living region of the future.

Los Angeles is no longer a city as the term has been conventionally defined. Sam S. Taylor, general manager of Los Angeles traffic, calls Los Angeles a "mobile region."

For anyone looking toward the future, toward the end result of the full autification of the American metropolis, Los Angeles is the phenomenon to analyze most carefully.

When Lincoln Steffens went to the Soviet Union just after the Bolshevik Revolution, he proclaimed, "I have seen the future—and it works."

Today's visitor to Los Angeles might paraphrase Steffens and say, "I have seen the future—and it doesn't work." (March 3, 1959)

Since that was written a great deal has happened, and it seems less likely today than it did then that the future lies with Gasopolis. The recently created federal Environmental Protection Agency has even proposed that, in order to cope with the smog problem, automobile traffic in Los Angeles should be cut by 80 percent through gasoline rationing. This was, to be sure, more for its shock effect than because the EPA or anyone else expects it to be taken seriously (one estimate is that an 80 percent reduction in auto traffic in Los Angeles would mean the

loss of 400,000 jobs). Still, this, like the already noted change in the public attitude toward the Interstate Highway System, is one of many indications that urban development in the United States is entering a new period in which increasingly serious efforts will be made to transform the automobile from the master to the servant of people.

Any attempt to elaborate on this theme would take us far beyond the confines of an essay aimed at elucidating the role of the automobile in the genesis of the present urban condition.²² I will only say in conclusion that while I believe certain palliatives to be possible, at least in principle, within the framework of the present monopoly capitalist system, I do not think that fundamental changes in the structure of cities and their relation to society as a whole can be effected without a radical change in the social order. In what I have called the traditional commuter situation, it should certainly be possible to bring about a great improvement in public transport both into and out of the inner city and also within the inner city. This, perhaps together with certain restrictions on the use of cars in the inner city, might do much to relieve congestion, particularly of the rush-hour variety. But it would leave untouched other kinds of movement within the metropolis which are much less susceptible to facilitation through improvement of public transport.²³ And

22. Let me add that this limitation of scope has also precluded more than passing allusions to the qualitative aspects of that condition. In particular the differential impact of automobilized urbanization on various income levels and social groups has been almost totally omitted. The poor who cannot afford cars and the elderly and handicapped who are unable to make use of them regardless of their income are either effectively immobilized or confined to very limited and usually decaying areas. This adds a tragic dimension of helplessness and misery to millions of already blighted lives.

23. In making judgments of this kind one is likely to be influenced by one's personal experience. I live in the New York metropolitan area in what used to be an old-style suburb. With a suitable improvement in the commuter railroad service and the inner-city subway-bus-taxi network—both of which are now in bad shape—I can easily imagine that I would hardly ever be tempted to drive into the downtown area. On the other hand, I also find it hard to imagine even an elaborate public transportation system which would satisfactorily substitute for the private car in the various other kinds of movement that are necessary for everyday living in the metropolis.

it would do nothing to check, let alone reverse, the sprawl process.

To accomplish these ends, and at the same time to eliminate congestion and pollution and in other ways make the city a better place to live, it seems to me an absolutely necessary (though far from sufficient) condition that the causal link between the location of economic activity and profit anticipations has to be decisively broken. Only if a rational job pattern is planned and assured for years ahead will it be possible to develop new residential communities with appropriate population densities and efficient public transportation systems both within and between them. And this requires not only public ownership of land but also socialization of the entire investment process so that production can be guided not by profit but for the satisfaction of the people's needs.

Around a centerpiece of wrecked automobiles, a Cadillac Eldorado bearing a red sign: "See Parnelli Jones destroy this car," a Rolls Royce Silver Shadow, a Lincoln Continental Mark IV, and some \$50,000 worth of other late-model cars bashed each other into junk here yesterday. Billed as the "world's richest demolition derby," it ended in a limping, sputtering confrontation between a battered Ford LTD and a Mercury station wagon. . . . "I figure it's a little like the last of the Roman Empire," George Daines said, as he bought tickets (at \$8 for adults and \$4 for children) for himself and his son. "I wanted to be here to watch the last of the American empire."

New York Times, February 20, 1973

THE MARCOS COUP IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY ROBERT B. STAUFFER

The following article deals with only one aspect of the Marcos coup. Economic and social conflict in the Philippines has been intensifying since the mid-1960s, distinguished by militant anti-imperialist struggle against the U.S. war in Vietnam and the U.S. penetration and influence in the Philippines. The Marcos government's policy of terror against the Muslim population of Mindanao, to make room for the expanding logging industry and other plantation interests, as well as against the popular anti-imperialist movement, created further tension. It was also in the last few years that the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines, was established and began guerrilla activity. In addition to these and other contributors to mounting economic and political crises, the ruling circles in the Philippines have been confronted with a nationalist coalition and legal developments that threatened the continuation of U. S. enterprise. The coup is examined here in the context of the latter development by Professor Stauffer who teaches political science at the University of Hawaii and has recently returned from a year of research and teaching in the Philippines. He adds by way of explanation: "The imposition of martial law by President Marcos in September 1972, is viewed in this paper as representing a seizure of power (by using the armed forces to eliminate the mass media, the Supreme Court, and Congress from the national decision-making process) sufficiently drastic to warrant use of the term *coup* to describe the event. In the first two months following seizure of power he manipulated the Constitutional Convention (sitting at the time to draft a constitution to replace the one dating from the American occupation) into (1) incorporating the policies of his "New Society" into the document, (2) extending his term as chief executive for an indefinite period subject only to his decision to hold new elections, and (3) making changes in existing constitutional safeguards governing the treatment of foreign private investment of a type designed to "attract" multinational corporations to invest in the Philippines."

The Editors

The central proposition advanced in this brief note is that various forms of foreign control over the Philippine economy, and especially over the growth patterns the economy is per-

mitted to take, have held back economic development to the degree that conditions have been created making a resort to authoritarian political direction of the type recently imposed by President Marcos extremely likely. The economy, as a consequence of outside domination maintained primarily through private foreign investment supported by American public policies, has been forced to retain its colonial form, with limited shifts to industrialization largely controlled from the United States.

An economist, Frank Golay, who has written extensively about the Philippine economy repeatedly asserts that Filipinos have successfully gained control of their economy from aliens. In a recent article he writes that "Filipinization has been rapid and the transformation of the inherited colonial-type economy has been substantially completed." (Golay, 1972, p. 19) In a paper presented at a Georgetown University seminar on Philippine-American economic relations in 1971, the same economist reportedly stated that "Filipinos know that Filipinization of the economy has been steady over the past two decades, and the array of legislation, administrative regulations, and policies which have been pursued have reduced American participation in the Philippine economy to only modest proportions." (*Manila Times*, July 7, 1971) The implication of this analysis is clear: since the economy has been Filipinized and its colonial character "transformed," any failure of the economy to satisfy the aspirations of Filipinos is due entirely to the Filipinos themselves, not to foreigners who might still be manipulating the system for their benefit rather than for the economic development of the Philippines.

There is a counterview abroad in the land on the question of who controls the Philippine economy. The radical movement stridently asserts that the Philippine economy is dominated by Americans and other "imperialists." Respected nationalist spokesmen make much the same point but in language less attuned to the street. If there has been Filipinization of the economy, it has meant only that a small group of Filipinos work with foreigners in maintaining a set of economic relationships in which both groups are richly rewarded at the expense of the large majority of Filipinos. The demonstrators' slogan of

"Imperialism, Feudalism, Fascism" summarizes the relationship.

Clearly there are two vastly different views of reality reflected in these statements about the Philippine economy. Golay is of course correct on Filipinization if only because the Philippine government's drive to eliminate the resident Chinese from the retail trade added a significant percentage of economic activity to the Filipino side of the ledger. Other formalistic shifts have been made possible through the growth of joint ventures and various other devices designed to mask the extent of the foreign presence in the Philippine economy. Golay, however, must be challenged on his assertion that American participation in the Philippine economy has been reduced to only "modest proportions." It is this type of claim that is bitterly rejected by all nationalist intellectuals in the Philippines today.

From an economist's point of view, direct control of traditional sectors of the Philippine economy by Americans and American corporations may have diminished somewhat since Philippine independence, although Golay's discussion of the point (1969: 92-93) relies on data before decontrol and monetary devaluation produced, after 1963, a new spurt of U.S. direct private investment in logging and plantation agriculture, as well as in an expanding network of American manufacturing and commercial activities. Expansion in the latter two sectors had been taking place since the beginning of the independence era. Recent expansion into new fields (e.g. automobile manufacturing for the Southeast Asia market) and the continued presence of sizable American investments give rise to a question about the propriety of the phrase "modest proportions." The conservative publication *Business Day's 1,000 Philippine Corporations* (1971) stated that "American corporations in the Philippines continued to dominate sales, income, assets, and equity indicators for the 1,000 largest firms in the country in 1969." (p. 8) In that same year the top 50 American corporations in the Philippines had assets of approximately \$1 billion: some 750 other American concerns are in business there. While the American Embassy attempts to play down the size of American private investment in the Philippines, claiming that it is only half a billion dollars, the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion sets the figure at \$2 billion. Quantitatively, the American equity in the country's top 50 corporations accounts for 42 percent of total stockholders' equity in all the 1,000 top companies.* Clearly the claim that the American presence in the Philippine economy has been reduced to only "modest proportions" requires considerable qualification.** The qualifications become arguments for rejection when other forms of American control over the economy are taken into account.

Much of the control over the Philippine economy results not only from foreign business but also from the growing indebtedness of the Philippines to other nations and to multilateral banking institutions. This indebtedness has been encouraged from outside and by Filipino economists who share the same developmental models as the foreign lenders.*** By 1970 the Philippines owed a total of \$1.96 billion to some 25 nations and international institutions and would have had to pay \$480 million that year in interest and amortization payments had not a major "restructuring" of the debt been negotiated. Had the \$480 million been paid, it would have represented 33 percent of the expected receipts from exports of goods and services for 1970. (*Manila Times*, Banking Supplement, October 29, 1971,

* The figure is 18.5 percent when computed on total assets. The difference between this and the 42 percent of total stockholders' equity suggests the measure of success U. S. business has had in gaining control through stockholdings and then raising most of the needed capital through bonds and other forms of debt.

** It should be noted that the *Business Day* statistics do *not* include American banks and insurance companies, and that the calculations in this paragraph were based on only the 50 top American corporations, not on all those in the Philippines.

*** Tristan Beplat, President of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce of New York and Vice President of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust, a leading bank in the 23-member American Bank consortium dealing with the Philippines, contends that the Philippines is in good shape financially and that the debt load is not excessive. By implication he argues for a larger debt, since the total is "about equal to the value of one year's exports," a figure he assures the Philippines is low. He states that the Philippine debt problem is that the nation is "overextended on short-term debts and underextended on long-term debts," a problem that "restructuring" could easily solve. (*The Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines*, February 1970, p. 4) His solution to the problem is the same one adopted by the economists from the Philippines who negotiated the debt "roll over" in 1970.

p. 10) The rapidly mounting debt load and its associated balance-of-payments problem brought strong pressure from the International Monetary Fund, ultimately forcing the Philippines to devalue its currency and adopt a "floating rate" for the peso.

Further indebtedness is being encouraged by the World Bank group and, concomitantly, support is being given to the Marcos administration's request for new taxes to raise sufficient money to pay the Philippine counterpart funds demanded before new World Bank loans will be extended. (*Manila Chronicle*, March 16, 1972) To this influence over the key decisions affecting the Philippines can be added the increasing role being played by the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the UNDP and a host of related United Nations agencies over the types of development projects that will be "encouraged" in nations like the Philippines. To the degree that outside agencies are permitted to exercise control over the types of "development" projects a nation can carry out, these agencies will determine the direction in which its economy will move. The evidence is conclusive that the web of controls exercised by these agencies is designed to assure only extremely gradualist modifications in the economic system, to keep the Philippines a steady source of the products it has traditionally supplied to the world market and especially the minerals that it has been supplying in ever larger quantities in recent years, and to maintain as much openness in the Philippine market for goods manufactured in the industrial nations as possible. The limited moves towards manufacturing are frequently those demanded by the powerful multinational corporations.

Other foreign influences over the economy exist. For more than two decades the United States has maintained a specialized bureaucracy in the Philippines for the express purpose of influencing the nature of the development process. During this period extreme pressure has at times been applied on the Philippine government to force it to adopt specific policies thought beneficial by the Americans: an example was the demand for tax reform in the early 1950s (Wurfel, 1959); another was the pressure applied in 1962 to devalue the peso. (Lichauco, 1968, p. 35) Routinely the programs supported through the years by USAID

and its predecessors have been of a type to perpetuate the existing economic system and its role in the world economy, and in no sense to promote developmental activities that would significantly alter the nature of the Philippine economy or its pattern of relations with the industrial nations of the world.

The last of the external sources of influence over the Philippine economy that deserves attention is Japan. As has been frequently noted by American economists, Japan has now surpassed the United States as a trading partner of the Philippines. The suddenness of Japan's move to first place, aided as it was by the flow of reparation goods to the Philippines, was made possible by Japan's competitive price position, by abundant credit offered by the Japanese, and by the availability in the Philippines of conditions that would permit long-term exclusive contracts to be made for the supply of raw materials urgently needed by Japanese industry. For various reasons, including the absence of a treaty to regularize trade and commerce between the two nations, Japanese corporations have not invested heavily as yet in the Philippines through direct private investments, although they have indirectly by extending credit. The overall effect of the Japanese on the Philippine economy seems to be in the direction of reinforcing the controls exercised by other external agencies, namely, to assure that any development of the Philippine economy be supportive of the interests of the industrial nations.

It is not the purpose of this note to discuss the rapidly expanding awareness on the part of a very wide range of the Filipino articulate public of the conditions described above. This awareness has produced a signal increase in critical writing on economic conditions in the Philippines, and especially on the destructive role played by foreign private corporations, and has helped spark the powerful protest movements that have been so much a part of the Manila political scene in the past several years. Americans in positions of power vis-à-vis the Philippines have had remarkably uniform response patterns to these Philippine developments. The president of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce of New York, after reviewing the "problems" faced by private foreign investors in the Philippines, urged that the Philippine government take forthright steps to resolve

the uncertainties in American-Philippine relations and to create a climate more favorable to foreign business. (Beplat, 1971, p. 45) This same point of view has been argued with increasing frequency in material printed in the American Embassy's publications, and especially in articles proclaiming the creative powers of foreign private investment appearing in *Free World* (Jacoby, 1971; Gaud, 1971; Holway, 1972), and in the *Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines*.

While the alleged advantages of placing greater reliance on private foreign investment for economic development were being touted by the Americans, the role of foreign business in the Philippines was being argued in the streets and behind college barricades on the bitter issue of whether or not Filipinos were to have any control over the price of oil products sold in their nation. Foreign oil companies (about 80 percent of the oil business is in American hands) had been successful in imposing price increases twice in a year despite mounting opposition from a variety of sectors of the community, and then proceeded almost immediately to submit petitions for a third increase. The last request corresponded with the most violent phase of the student demonstrations against the government and ended in a temporary postponement of the new price increase demands from the oil companies: hearings on the issue were delayed until after the 1971 elections. American business, and especially the oil corporations in the era of confrontation politics, has contributed massively to the political radicalization of the younger generation of Filipinos, of important sectors of the working class, and of those engaged in the mass media. American public and private pressure to extend and expand the system of foreign corporation control of the Philippine economy has contributed to the polarization of politics between the President and a loose nationalist coalition that has incessantly pressed its demands to break away from foreign control of the Philippine economy.

In view of the conflict between growing pressure from the Americans to resolve the uncertainties surrounding private foreign investment in the Philippines in a manner favorable to their continued—and expanded—operation in the future, and on the other hand the strong private and public pressures in the

Philippines to impose increasingly strict controls over foreign business,* President Marcos was forced to make a choice: join the nationalists in seeking a rapid elimination of foreign investments and foreign controls over the Philippine economy, or join the foreign—and especially American—interests in altering the constitutional system so that the special position of American business can be extended past the 1974 deadline. President Marcos chose the latter option, and to implement his choice he had to resort to martial law as a device through which the nationalist coalition could be silenced if not destroyed, and the constitutional changes begun to permit his continued rule past the appointed termination of his second—and final—term as President, and to weaken the power of opposition forces to challenge executive action. Whatever the short-run outcome of martial law may be, one thing seems certain: President Marcos has begun a process that at least for the present should guarantee the interests of American business in the Philippines. For the first time in the history of the Philippines as an independent nation, martial law and the coup have been made a

* Congress had become increasingly critical of foreign business in recent years and had passed a number of bills placing restrictions on areas in which new investments might be made. The Supreme Court, in a stunning decision on August 20, 1972, declared that all American property acquired in the Philippines under the “parity” amendment and the Laurel-Langley Agreement would revert to the Philippines at the termination of the agreement in 1974. This means that the Americans would not only lose their “special right” to buy property and to engage in extracting raw materials from the Philippines, as well as to engage in any type of business, but would also lose what they had acquired during the life of the “parity” arrangements. I would anticipate that with a greater perspective of time from which to view the events of 1972, this Supreme Court decision will be held to have been the single most important event determining when—but not why—the coup occurred.

The new draft constitution reverses the August 1972 decision of the Supreme Court and reasserts the right of Americans to retain title to any land or property that otherwise could not have been acquired legally except for the special provisions accorded them as a result of “parity.” (Article 17, Section 11, approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 29, 1972.) The constitution was to have been submitted to a national plebiscite January 15, 1973. At the last moment President Marcos cancelled the plebiscite and ordered “citizens’ assemblies” to discuss issues related to martial law and the constitution. On the question of the new charter he secured a 97 percent “vote” (by show of hands) in favor. He immediately proclaimed the constitution “ratified” and himself president *and* prime minister. Reports indicate he intends to postpone elections for seven years.

part of the governing process: the beginning of the "Latin Americanization" of Philippine politics has begun.

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THE AFRICAN ROOTS OF WAR

BY W. E. B. DuBOIS

Reprinted here is a little known, yet important, article by W.E.B. Du Bois on the imperialist origins of the First World War. This article, which stressed the significance of the rivalry among the imperialist powers over the division of the African continent, appeared in the May 1915 issue of *Atlantic Monthly*, about a year before Lenin completed his classic *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Dr. DuBois did not attempt, as did Lenin, to develop a full-blown theory of imperialism. But it is equally clear that his essay is informed by extensive and critical study of the subject. Among the interesting points of coincidence between Lenin and DuBois is the attention paid by the latter to the relation between imperialism and the growth of a labor aristocracy. On the other hand, it should be noted how much more importance Dr. DuBois gave to the ties between racism and imperialism. This article is published by permission of Shirley Graham DuBois, and will appear in the collected works of W. E. B. DuBois, to be published by Kraus-Thomson Organization Ltd.—The Editors.

“*Semper novi quid ex Africa*” cried the Roman proconsul; and he voiced the verdict of forty centuries. Yet there are those who would write world history and leave out this most marvelous of continents. Particularly today, most men assume that Africa lies far afield from the centers of our burning social problems, and especially from our present problem of world war.

Yet in a very real sense Africa is a prime cause of this terrible overturning of civilization which we have lived to see; and these words seek to show how in the Dark Continent are hidden the roots, not simply of war today but of the menace of wars tomorrow.

Always, Africa is giving us something new or some metempsychosis of a world-old thing. On its black bosom arose one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of self-protecting civilizations, and grew so mightily that it still furnishes superlatives to thinking and speaking men. Out of its darker and more remote forest fastnesses came, if we may credit many recent scientists, the first welding of iron, and we know that agriculture and trade flourished there when Europe was a wilderness.

Nearly every human empire that has arisen in the world, material and spiritual, has found some of its greatest crises on this continent of Africa, from Greece to Great Britain. As Mommsen says, "It was through Africa that Christianity became the religion of the world." In Africa, the last flood of Germanic invasions spent itself within hearing of the last gasp of Byzantium, and it was again through Africa that Islam came to play its great role of conqueror and civilizer.

With the Renaissance and the widened world of modern thought, Africa came no less suddenly with her new old gift. Shakespeare's *Ancient Pistol* cries,

A foutra for the world, and worldlings base!
I speak of Africa, and golden joys.

He echoes a legend of gold from the days of Punt and Ophir to those of Ghana, the Gold Coast, and the Rand. This thought had sent the world's greed scurrying down the hot, mysterious coasts of Africa to the Good Hope of gain, until for the first time a real world commerce was born, albeit it started as a commerce mainly in the bodies and souls of men.

So much for the past; and now, today: the Berlin Conference to apportion the rising riches of Africa among the white peoples met on the fifteenth day of November 1884. Eleven days earlier, three Germans left Zanzibar (whither they had gone secretly disguised as mechanics), and before the Berlin Conference had finished its deliberations they had annexed to Germany an area over half as large again as the whole German Empire in Europe. Only in its dramatic suddenness was this undisguised robbery of the land of 7 million natives different from the methods by which Great Britain and France got 4 million square miles each, Portugal three quarters of a million, and Italy and Spain smaller but substantial areas.

The methods by which this continent has been stolen have been contemptible and dishonest beyond expression. Lying treaties, rivers of rum, murder, assassination, mutilation, rape, and torture have marked the progress of Englishman, German, Frenchman, and Belgian on the Dark Continent. The only way in which the world has been able to endure the horrible tale is by deliberately stopping its ears and changing the subject of conversation while the devilry went on.

It all began, singularly enough, like the present war, with Belgium. Many of us remember Stanley's great solution of the puzzle of Central Africa when he traced the mighty Congo sixteen hundred miles from Nyangwe to the sea. Suddenly the world knew that here lay the key to the riches of Central Africa. It stirred uneasily, but Leopold of Belgium was first on his feet, and the result was the Congo Free State—God save the mark! But the Congo Free State, with all its magniloquent heralding of peace, Christianity, and commerce, degenerating into murder, mutilation, and downright robbery, differed only in degree and concentration from the tale of all Africa in this rape of a continent already furiously mangled by the slave trade. The sinister traffic, on which the British Empire and the American Republic were largely built, cost black Africa no less than 100 million souls, the wreckage of its political and social life, and left the continent in precisely that state of helplessness which invites aggression and exploitation. "Color" became, in the world's thought, synonymous with inferiority, "Negro" lost its capitalization, and Africa was another name for bestiality and barbarism.

Thus the world began to invest in color prejudice. The "color line" began to pay dividends. For indeed, while the exploration of the valley of the Congo was the occasion of the scramble for Africa, the cause lay deeper. The Franco-Prussian War turned the eyes of those who sought power and dominion away from Europe. Already England was in Africa, cleaning away the debris of the slave trade and half-consciously groping toward the new imperialism. France, humiliated and impoverished, looked toward a new northern African empire sweeping from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. More slowly, Germany began to see the dawning of a new day, and, shut out from

America by the Monroe Doctrine, looked to Asia and Africa for colonies. Portugal sought anew to make good her claim to her ancient African realm; and thus a continent where Europe claimed but a tenth of the land in 1875 was in twenty-five more years practically absorbed.

Why was this? What was the new call for dominion? It must have been strong, for consider a moment the desperate flames of war that have shot up in Africa in the last quarter of a century: France and England at Fashoda, Italy at Adua, Italy and Turkey in Tripoli, England and Portugal at Delagoa Bay, England, Germany and the Dutch in South Africa, France and Spain in Morocco, Germany and France in Agadir, and the world at Algeiras.

The answer to this riddle we shall find in the economic changes in Europe. Remember what the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have meant to organized industry in European civilization. Slowly the divine right of the few to determine economic income and distribute the goods and services of the world has been questioned and curtailed. We called the process revolution in the eighteenth century, advancing democracy in the nineteenth, and socialization of wealth in the twentieth. But whatever we call it, the movement is the same: the dipping of more and grimmer hands into the wealth-bag of the nation, until today only the ultra-stubborn fail to see that democracy in determining income is the next inevitable step to democracy in political power.

With the waning of the possibility of the big fortune, gathered by starvation wage and boundless exploitation of one's weaker and poorer fellows at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad. Always, of course, the individual merchant had at his own risk and in his own way tapped the riches of foreign lands. Later, special trading monopolies had entered the field and founded empires overseas. Soon, however, the mass of merchants at home demanded a share in this golden stream; and finally, in the twentieth century, the laborer at home is demanding and beginning to receive a part of his share.

The theory of this new democratic despotism has not been clearly formulated. Most philosophers see the ship of state

launched on the broad, irresistible tide of democracy, with only delaying eddies here and there; others, looking closer, are more disturbed. Are we, they ask, reverting to aristocracy and despotism—the rule of might? They cry out and then rub their eyes, for surely they cannot fail to see strengthening democracy all about them?

It is this paradox which has confounded philanthropists, curiously betrayed the socialists, and reconciled the imperialists and captains of industry to any amount of “democracy.” It is this paradox which allows in America the most rapid advance of democracy to go hand in hand in its very centers with increased aristocracy and hatred toward darker races, and which excuses and defends an inhumanity that does not shrink from the public burning of human beings.

Yet the paradox is easily explained: the white workingman has been asked to share the spoil of exploiting “chinks and niggers.” It is no longer simply the merchant prince, or the aristocratic monopoly, or even the employing class, that is exploiting the world: it is the nation, a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor. The laborers are not yet getting, to be sure, as large a share as they want or will get, and there are still at the bottom large and restless excluded classes. But the laborer’s equity is recognized, and his just share is a matter of time, intelligence, and skillful negotiation.

Such nations it is that rule the modern world. Their national bond is no mere sentimental patriotism, loyalty, or ancestor worship. It is increased wealth, power, and luxury for all classes on a scale the world never saw before. Never before was the average citizen of England, France, and Germany so rich, with such splendid prospects of greater riches.

Whence comes this new wealth and on what does its accumulation depend? It comes primarily from the darker nations of the world—Asia and Africa, South and Central America, the West Indies and the islands of the South Seas. There are still, we may believe, many parts of white countries like Russia and North America, not to mention Europe itself, where the older exploitation still holds. But the knell has sounded faint and far, even there. In the lands of darker folk, however, no knell has sounded. Chinese, East Indians, Negroes, and

South American Indians are by common consent for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them. To the furtherance of this highly profitable economic dictum has been brought every available resource of science and religion. Thus arises the astonishing doctrine of the natural inferiority of most men to the few, and the interpretation of "Christian brotherhood" as meaning anything that one of the "brothers" may at any time want it to mean.

Like all world schemes, however, this one is not quite complete. First of all, yellow Japan has apparently escaped the cordon of this color bar. This is disconcerting and dangerous to white hegemony. If, of course, Japan would join heart and soul with the whites against the rest of the yellows, browns, and blacks, well and good. There are even good-natured attempts to prove the Japanese "Aryan," provided they act "white." But blood is thick, and there are signs that Japan does not dream of a world governed mainly by white men. This is the "Yellow Peril," and it may be necessary, as the German Emperor and many white Americans think, to start a world crusade against this presumptuous nation which demands "white" treatment.

Then, too, the Chinese have recently shown unexpected signs of independence and autonomy, which may possibly make it necessary to take them into account a few decades hence. As a result, the problem in Asia has resolved itself into a race for "spheres" of economic "influence," each provided with a more or less "open door" for business opportunity. This reduces the danger of open clash between European nations, and gives the yellow folk such chance for desperate unarmed resistance as was shown by China's repulse of the Six Nations of Bankers. There is still hope among some whites that conservative North China and the radical South may in time come to blows and allow actual white dominion.

One thing, however, is certain: Africa is prostrate. There at least are few signs of self-consciousness that need at present be heeded. To be sure, Abyssinia must be wheedled, and in America and the West Indies Negroes have attempted futile steps toward freedom; but such steps have been pretty effectually stopped (save through the breach of "miscegenation"),

although the 10 million Negroes in the United States need, to many men's minds, careful watching and ruthless repression.

Thus the white European mind has worked, and worked the more feverishly because Africa is the Land of the Twentieth Century. The world knows something of the gold and diamonds of South Africa, the cocoa of Angola and Nigeria, the rubber and ivory of the Congo, and the palm oil of the West Coast. But does the ordinary citizen realize the extraordinary economic advances of Africa and, too, of black Africa, in recent years? E. D. Morel, who knows his Africa better than most white men, has shown us how the export of palm oil from West Africa has grown from 283 tons in 1800, to 80,000 tons in 1913, which together with by-products is worth today \$60 million annually. He shows how native Gold Coast labor, unsupervised, has come to head the cocoa-producing countries of the world with an export of 89 million pounds (weight *not* money) annually. He shows how the cotton crop of Uganda has risen from 3,000 bales in 1909 to 50,000 bales in 1914; and he says that France and Belgium are no more remarkable in the cultivation of their land than the Negro province of Kano. The trade of Abyssinia amounts to only \$10 million a year, but it is its infinite possibility of growth that is making the nations crowd to Addis Ababa.

All these things are but beginnings; "but tropical Africa and its peoples are being brought more irrevocably each year into the vortex of the economic influences that sway the western world." There can be no doubt of the economic possibilities of Africa in the near future. There are not only the well-known and traditional products, but boundless chances in a hundred different directions, and above all, there is a throng of human beings who, could they once be reduced to the docility and steadiness of Chinese coolies or of seventeenth and eighteenth-century European laborers, would furnish to their masters a spoil exceeding the gold-haunted dreams of the most modern of imperialists.

This, then, is the real secret of that desperate struggle for Africa which began in 1877 and is now culminating. Economic dominion outside Africa has, of course, played its part, and we were on the verge of the partition of Asia when Asiatic

shrewdness warded it off. America was saved from direct political dominion by the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, more and more, the imperialists have concentrated on Africa.

The greater the concentration the more deadly the rivalry. From Fashoda to Agadir, repeatedly the spark has been applied to the European magazine and a general conflagration narrowly averted. We speak of the Balkans as the storm center of Europe and the cause of war, but this is mere habit. The Balkans are convenient for occasions, but the ownership of materials and men in the darker world is the real prize that is setting the nations of Europe at each other's throats today.

The present world war is, then, the result of jealousies engendered by the recent rise of armed national associations of labor and capital whose aim is the exploitation of the wealth of the world mainly outside the European circle of nations. These associations, grown jealous and suspicious at the division of the spoils of trade-empire, are fighting to enlarge their respective shares; they look for expansion, not in Europe but in Asia, and particularly in Africa. "We want no inch of French territory," said Germany to England, but Germany was "unable to give" similar assurances as to France in Africa.

The difficulties of this imperial movement are internal as well as external. Successful aggression in economic expansion calls for a close union between capital and labor at home. Now the rising demands of the white laborer, not simply for wages but for conditions of work and a voice in the conduct of industry, make industrial peace difficult. The workingmen have been appeased by all sorts of essays in state socialism, on the one hand, and on the other hand by public threats of competition by colored labor. By threatening to send English capital to China and Mexico, by threatening to hire Negro laborers in America, as well as by old-age pensions and accident insurance, we gain industrial peace at home at the mightier cost of war abroad.

In addition to these national war-engendering jealousies there is a more subtle movement arising from the attempt to unite labor and capital in worldwide freebooting. Democracy in economic organization, while an acknowledged ideal, is today working itself out by admitting to a share in the spoils of capital

only the aristocracy of labor—the more intelligent and shrewder and cannier workingmen. The ignorant, unskilled, and restless still form a large, threatening, and, to a growing extent, revolutionary group in advanced countries.

The resultant jealousies and bitter hatred tend continually to fester along the color line. We must fight the Chinese, the laborer argues, or the Chinese will take our bread and butter. We must keep Negroes in their places, or Negroes will take our jobs. All over the world there leaps to articulate speech and ready action that singular assumption that if white men do not throttle colored men, then China, India, and Africa will do to Europe what Europe has done and seeks to do to them.

On the other hand, in the minds of yellow, brown, and black men the brutal truth is clearing: a white man is privileged to go to any land where advantage beckons and behave as he pleases; the black or colored man is being more and more confined to those parts of the world where life for climatic, historical, economic, and political reasons is most difficult to live and most easily dominated by Europe for Europe's gain.

What, then, are we to do, who desire peace and the civilization of all men? Hitherto the peace movement has confined itself chiefly to figures about the cost of war and platitudes on humanity. What do nations care about the cost of war, if by spending a few hundred millions in steel and gunpowder they can gain a thousand million in diamonds and cocoa? How can love of humanity appeal as a motive to nations whose love of luxury is built on the inhuman exploitation of human beings, and who, especially in recent years, have been taught to regard these human beings as inhuman? I appealed to the last meeting of peace societies in St. Louis, saying, "Should you not discuss racial prejudice as a prime cause of war?" The secretary was sorry but was unwilling to introduce controversial matters!

We, then, who want peace, must remove the real causes of war. We have extended gradually our conception of democracy beyond our social class to all social classes in our nation; we have gone further and extended our democratic ideals not simply to all classes of our own nation, but to those of other nations of our blood and lineage—to what we call "European" civilization. If we want real peace and lasting culture, how-

ever, we must go further. We must extend the democratic ideal to the yellow, brown, and black peoples.

To say this is to evoke on the faces of modern men a look of blank hopelessness. Impossible! we are told, and for so many reasons—scientific, social, and what not—that argument is useless. But let us not conclude too quickly. Suppose we have to choose between this unspeakably inhuman outrage on decency and intelligence and religion which we call the World War and the attempt to treat black men as human, sentient, responsible beings? We have sold them as cattle. We are working them as beasts of burden. We shall not drive war from this world until we treat them as free and equal citizens in a world democracy of all races and nations. Impossible? Democracy is a method of doing the impossible. It is the only method yet discovered of making the education and development of all men a matter of all men's desperate desire. It is putting firearms in the hands of a child with the object of compelling the child's neighbors to teach him, not only the real and legitimate uses of a dangerous tool but the uses of himself in all things. Are there other and less costly ways of accomplishing this? There may be in some better world. But for a world just emerging from the rough chains of an almost universal poverty, and faced by the temptation of luxury and indulgence through the enslaving of defenseless men, there is but one adequate method of salvation—the giving of democratic weapons of self-defense to the defenseless.

Nor need we quibble over those ideas—wealth, education, and political power—soil which we have so forested with claim and counterclaim that we see nothing for the woods.

What the primitive peoples of Africa and the world need and must have if war is to be abolished is perfectly clear:

First: land. Today Africa is being enslaved by the theft of her land and natural resources. A century ago black men owned all but a morsel of South Africa. The Dutch and England came, and today 1,250,000 whites own 264 million acres, leaving only 21 million acres for 4,500,000 natives. Finally, to make assurance doubly sure, the Union of South Africa has refused natives even the right to *buy* land. This is a deliberate attempt to force the Negroes to work on farms and in mines

and kitchens for low wages. All over Africa has gone this shameless monopolizing of land and natural resources to force poverty on the masses and reduce them to the "dumb-driven-cattle" stage of labor activity.

Secondly: we must train native races in modern civilization. This can be done. Modern methods of educating children, honestly and effectively applied, would make modern, civilized nations out of the vast majority of human beings on earth today. This we have seldom tried. For the most part Europe is straining every nerve to make over yellow, brown, and black men into docile beasts of burden, and only an irrepressible few are allowed to escape and seek (usually abroad) the education of modern men.

Lastly: the principle of home rule must extend to groups, nations, and races. The ruling of one people for another people's whim or gain must stop. This kind of despotism has been in later days more and more skillfully disguised. But the brute fact remains: the white man is ruling black Africa for the white man's gain, and just as far as possible he is doing the same to colored races elsewhere. Can such a situation bring peace? Will any amount of European concord or disarmament settle this injustice?

Political power today is but the weapon to force economic power. Tomorrow, it may give us spiritual vision and artistic sensibility. Today, it gives us or tries to give us bread and butter, and those classes or nations or races who are without it starve, and starvation is the weapon of the white world to reduce them to slavery.

We are calling for European concord today; but at the utmost European concord will mean satisfaction with, or acquiescence in, a given division of the spoils of world dominion. After all, European disarmament cannot go below the necessity of defending the aggressions of the whites against the blacks and browns and yellows. From this will arise three perpetual dangers of war. First, renewed jealousy at any division of colonies or spheres of influence agreed upon, if at any future time the present division comes to seem unfair. Who cared for Africa in the early nineteenth century? Let England have the scraps left from the golden feast of the slave trade. But in the twentieth

century? The end was war. These scraps looked too tempting to Germany.

Secondly: war will come from the revolutionary revolt of the lowest workers. The greater the international jealousies, the greater the corresponding costs of armament and the more difficult to fulfill the promises of industrial democracy in advanced countries. Finally, the colored peoples will not always submit passively to foreign domination. To some this is a lightly tossed truism. When a people deserve liberty they fight for it and get it, say such philosophers, thus making war a regular, necessary step to liberty. Colored people are familiar with this complacent judgment. They endure the contemptuous treatment meted out by whites to those not "strong" enough to be free. These nations and races, composing as they do a vast majority of humanity, are going to endure this treatment just as long as they must and not a moment longer. Then they are going to fight and the War of the Color Line will outdo in savage inhumanity any war this world has yet seen. For colored folk have much to remember and they will not forget.

But is this inevitable? Must we sit helpless before this awful prospect? While we are planning, as a result of the present holocaust, the disarmament of Europe and a European international world police, must the rest of the world be left naked to the inevitable horror of war, especially when we know that it is directly in this outer circle of races, and not in the inner European household, that the real causes of present European fighting are to be found?

Our duty is clear. Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow. Steadfast faith in humanity must come. The domination of one people by another without the other's consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject peoples must go. Religious hypocrisy must stop. "Bloodthirsty" Mwanga of Uganda killed an English bishop because they feared that his coming meant English domination. It did mean English domination, and the world and the bishop knew it, and yet the world was "horrified"! Such missionary hypocrisy must go. With clean hands and honest hearts we must front high heaven and beg peace in our time.

In this great work who can help us? In the Orient, the awakened Japanese and the awakening leaders of New China; in India and Egypt, the young men trained in Europe and European ideals, who now form the stuff that revolution is born of. But in Africa? Who better than the 25 million grandchildren of the European slave trade, spread through the Americas and now writhing desperately for freedom and a place in the world? And of these millions, first of all the 10 million black folk of the United States, now a problem, then a world salvation.

Twenty centuries before Christ a great cloud swept over sea and settled on Africa, darkening and well-nigh blotting out the culture of the land of Egypt. For half a thousand years it rested there until a black woman, Queen Nefertiti, "the most venerated figure in Egyptian history," rose to the throne of the Pharaohs and redeemed the world and her people. Twenty centuries after Christ, black Africa, prostrate, raped, and shamed, lies at the feet of the conquering Philistines of Europe. Beyond the awful sea a black woman is weeping and waiting with her sons on her breast. What shall the end be? The world-old and fearful things, war and wealth, murder and luxury? Or shall it be a new thing—a new peace and new democracy of all races: a great humanity of equal men? "*Semper novi quid ex Africa!*"

THE SPIRIT OF IMPERIALISM
(From a well-known Protestant hymn)

From Greenland's icy mountains,
From India's coral strand,
Where Afric's sunny fountains
Roll down their golden sand,
From many an ancient river,
From many a palmy plain,
They call us to deliver
Their land from error's chain.

—Bishop Reginald Heber
(1783-1826)

FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND U. S. IMPERIALISM

BY FRANK G. GREENWOOD

No figure in Afro-American history looms larger and more distinctively than Frederick Douglass, abolitionist, orator, editor, freedom fighter, Unionist, apostle of struggle, pioneer women's rights advocate, internationalist, and advisor to Abraham Lincoln.

Nearly every black school child has been inspired by the thrilling story of how Frederick Douglass ran away from slavery in the early nineteenth century and with no formal education struggled to become one of the most effective fighters against chattel slavery in American history. He has justifiably been called the "Father of the present day Civil Rights Movement"¹* and the Apostle of Struggle.

This, of course, is how "Negro history" has dealt with Frederick Douglass. But how does "revolutionary black history" view him?

First, let us define our terms.

Negro history came into being because of a crying need, the need to combat the murderous racism against the Afro-American and to inspire and justify the black and white freedom fighters in their battle to end chattel slavery. The earliest "Negro history" was written by black writers and white abolitionists.² It was, then and now, primarily "success stories" of Afros who heroically rose from the depths of oppression and poverty to the heights of fame and riches.

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* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

Admittedly, "Negro history" has played a positive role in the black liberation movement. It has refuted or combated many of the lies and slanders about black people and acted as a curb on the rampant racism in this genocidal society. Black history has inspired the black masses to walk in dignity and pride; it has motivated our black youth to individually achieve "first Negro" positions in many areas still closed to the black masses by this oppressive, capitalistic society. Now, however, is the time to re-examine it critically because it has been almost completely co-opted by the Establishment and is being used to retard the struggle for complete freedom. And that is precisely why a new group of black revolutionary history writers must emerge to write history from an entirely new viewpoint, the viewpoint of the black masses.

"Black revolutionary history," then, is the story of the heroic, unending fight of the black masses to gain complete freedom from the oppressor. It is definitely not the story of a few black men and women who "made it" into the rapacious capitalist system. It is the story of the masses, the true makers of history.

The cunning oppressor has cynically pointed to Negro history and said to the black masses: "See? Your own history proves that America is truly a land of opportunity. Be good Negroes like Booker T. Washington, George Washington Carver, Mary McCleod Bethune, and Marian Anderson and you can make it, too. All you Negroes have to do is work hard, prepare yourselves, obey the law and some day, you too, will be admitted into the mainstream of the good, old American way of life." Opportunistic middle-class or petty bourgeois (boozies) Negroes have also co-opted Negro history to act as a wedge to help them force their way into that very same polluted mainstream. The boozies point to Negro history and say: "See, good white folks? Negroes have achieved. And I'm like the achievers, not the dirty niggers in the ghetto. Please let me integrate, too."

Both of these attitudes must be exposed and fought, and if the black masses are to advance our struggle we must now start rejecting "Negro history" and replace it with "revolutionary black history," the agonizing, epic story of the black masses' struggle against their captors in America. This story of a nation within a nation must now be told.

However, to appraise “Negro history heroes” critically is to invite the wrath of the black boozies and the frowns of the Establishment. But it must be done if we are to move our struggle to a new level. Black revolutionaries must re-examine critically the role our great men and women have played in advancing or retarding the struggle for complete liberation.

And now to Frederick Douglass.

There is very little to frown upon or criticize in the career of the young Frederick Douglass. Some revolutionary black historians may say that Douglass was taken over early by white abolitionists and lagged behind mass demands by his early advocacy of “moral suasion”—advocating changing the minds and hearts of whites North and South to effect the end of chattel slavery.³ But Douglass was groping, learning, growing, and examining new ideas and methods of struggle and organization in the battle for abolition; and his findings aided not only the abolition movement in particular but the black mass struggle in general. Douglass was one of the first to see the necessity of both interracial struggle against “the peculiar institution” as well as independent national struggle by the black masses. He saw the need for struggle by any and all means necessary, and that included political, economic, social, and finally military means. Douglass’s independent study and analysis of the U.S. Constitution showed him that philosophically and legally this document was antagonistic to chattel slavery. He saw early in his career that oppression of man by man or woman by man was against the welfare of the oppressed everywhere and should be combated by the oppressed everywhere in unity. In many respects he outdistanced such great white abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips. We can truthfully say then, that the overall contributions of Douglass were so outstanding that he was easily the greatest figure in the entire abolitionist movement, including blacks and whites.

The obnoxious period in Douglass’s career did not occur until the end of the Civil War when he allied himself with the Republican Party and became their first important show-case, token Negro. It is this period that the writer will now deal with because there are many important lessons to be learned from this unfortunate period, lessons that can be applied to help fight and win in the present-day struggle for black freedom.

First, however, there is some very important historical background that must be covered if we are to critically appraise Douglass's latter-day role. Perhaps the most important thing to remember in the history of the United States preceding the Civil War was that this nation was ruled and dominated economically and politically by two primary economic forces—the Lords of the Loom and the Lords of the Lash.⁴ The former made up the merchant-industrial class of the East and North, and the latter the planter class of the South. Both ruling classes believed in and supported the enslavement of the Afro-American people because it was profitable, and every one of the original thirteen colonies practiced chattel slavery in some period of its history. It was only because free labor (wage slavery) was found to be more profitable in the North that it slowly gave up chattel slavery. Northern merchants, however, still profited from the slavery system in the South and it was primarily Northern ships that kept bringing slaves to the South and other parts of the Americas long after the end of the Revolutionary War.

The next vital point to remember is that the Civil War came about primarily because of the clash between these two expanding profit systems. Each was determined to gain control of the government and nation to insure greater profits from its system of exploitation of man by man. The struggle for complete control of this nation by these two dominant classes had been going on from the end of the American Revolution of 1776 and can be clearly detected in the deals and compromises in the U.S. Constitution. Note the “checks-and-balances” system, the definition of Afros as three-fifths of a human being, etc. This same struggle can also be seen in laws and compromises such as the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Compromise of 1850, etc.

Despite these deals and compromises, however, the more efficient system of the North began slowly to wrest political power from the Southern planters, and the struggle came to a climax with the advent of the Civil War.

The black masses, writhing under the lash of oppression and slavery, predictably allied themselves with the Republican Party, the political arm of the Northern merchant class. And it

was this black power added to the labor force and military force that tipped the scales for the North and helped preserve the Union. No less a person than Abraham Lincoln said as much on more than five occasions.⁵ The black masses helped free themselves by working, fighting, and dying; and they were not freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, despite the myth to the contrary. It was only through revolutionary struggle in conjunction with the most progressive forces in the North and the black masses that the North won the war and chattel slavery came to an end in this country.

When the Civil War ended, the Northern industrialists were eager to profit from their new control over the South and eagerly agreed with the radical Republicans in their demand to grant the franchise to the freed slaves, because this insured political control. The Lords of the Lash counter-attacked, however, through genocidal attempts to drive Afros back into slavery. These murderous attacks were coupled with a drive for political control through the Democratic Party. Their class brothers of the North slowly began to retreat from their earlier democratic reforms and thus began the betrayal of the black masses.

The industrialists knew that wealth comes from land and labor. They controlled the land, and now they wanted cheap black labor to work that land. They refused to listen to the demands of Thad Stevens and Charles Sumner for "forty acres and two mules" for the 4 million ex-slaves and instead made a deal with the bourbons, a deal that relegated Afro-Americans to a new slavery and made the white bourbons junior partners of the northern industrialists.⁶

Now, at last, northern capitalism had stability and control of the entire nation and could look around for new worlds beyond its borders to exploit. Now, too, the stage was set for Frederick Douglass to make his appearance in a very bad role for the black masses at home and abroad.

The year 1877 was the year of betrayal of the black masses and of the democratic forces in this country; it also was the year that Douglass became a token Negro or the first show-case Negro of American imperialism. The eminent black historian Benjamin Quarles states it this way: "Douglass's party loyalty

was rewarded in 1877, by his appointment as Marshal of the District of Columbia. It must be added, however, that the appointment stemmed in part from President Hayes' desire to placate the Negroes for his withdrawal from the South of the remaining Federal troops, the backbone of the Republican-Negro regime."⁷

This writer contends that the latter factor was unquestionably the chief reason Douglass was appointed to this relatively insignificant post. The racist Hayes and the financial interests behind him didn't give a damn about Douglass or the black masses they had so cynically betrayed. And to prove his true disregard for Douglass the President reduced the duties of the Marshal immediately after Douglass obtained this small crumb of tokenism. The office required the Marshal to attend presidential receptions and to introduce guests at the White House. These two duties were stripped from Douglass when he took office.⁸ Interestingly enough, Douglass did not raise his voice and thunder out at the betrayal of the black masses by the Hayes-Tilden sellout, but he most certainly did protest vociferously at this insult to himself.

The new rulers needed a man like Douglass to help them at home and abroad.⁹ They wanted to maintain political power at home by keeping the black vote in their hip pocket close to their wallets, and Douglass could help. The new rulers had to keep the black vote to offset the counter-offensive of elements of the old planter class in its attempt to regain political power via the Democratic Party. Also, the industrialists faced a new threat: the democratic, radical forces of labor and farmers who were thoroughly disenchanted and enraged by the rapacious policies of the money-hungry industrialists who were robbing and exploiting them and the black masses. The farmers organized their own political party, the Populists, in self-protection and were making a strong appeal and bid for black mass support. All these opposing groups had to be stopped if the imperialists were to realize maximum profits at home and expand their drive for even more profits abroad. Douglass could be used in a token, show-case capacity and thereby help accomplish both ends—ends that were definitely against the interests of the oppressed blacks at home or abroad. And by eagerly going along

with the new rulers' cynical plans, Douglass dealt a blow to the black liberation movements at home and abroad. He allowed the Republican party to say to the black masses: "See? We're still your friends. Look what we did for you nigras. Why, we even gave one of your greatest spokesmen an office in the United States government. Now isn't that white of us?" But at the same time that this was being said, not a word from them or a single act to counter the terror that the hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned Afros were facing alone at the hands of the Southern whites bent on forcing Afro-Americans back into slavery. And Douglass was so out of touch with his own people at this critical period of struggle that he actually objected when thousands of them fled West from the blood bath they were suffering in the South.¹⁰ The black masses were attempting to follow the leadership of Adams and "Pap" Singleton who were trying to lead them to a better life through a movement called "The Exodusters." This movement was the bitter but logical result of the refusal of the Republicans to protect their loyal supporters—the black masses. Yet Douglass stubbornly contended that Afros should not run away but stay where they had political power, numbers, etc. What an ironic turnabout: here was the man who had run to Canada to avoid capture when his name was linked to the ill-fated attack on Harper's Ferry. Here was the man who had gained his freedom by running away from chains. Here was the man who ran all the way to Europe to escape possible re-enslavement after he published his autobiography now telling the brutalized, helpless black masses that they must win freedom "by right, not flight."¹¹

In later months, however, when the great man tore himself away from interviews, paid lectures, letter writing, banquets, government functions, etc., and traveled to the South and saw firsthand what was happening to the black masses, then, and only then, did he belatedly and grudgingly admit that perhaps he had misjudged the justification for flight.¹²

Douglass also helped the imperialists domestically by his misleadership in black unions and social organizations. When black workers attempted to organize their own unions after being denied membership in the white racist unions, Douglass was invited to address them and offer advice. Invariably he

would counsel them against independent or radical political action or alliance with leftist groupings like the Populist movement and kept spewing the same old line: "The Republican party is the deck, all else is the sea."¹³ And because of his tremendous prestige, most black organizations heeded his advice.

With their home base now relatively secure, the imperialists looked greedily abroad for greater profits through American expansion and control. Men like Douglass and other distinguished blacks could be used in lands with large or predominantly black populations to sugar coat the bitter pill of imperialist rule.

And so we come to what may have been Douglass's greatest disservice to the black liberation movement: his appointment as Minister to Haiti under the Garfield administration. Douglass tried to act fairly towards the black Haitians, and he was greatly respected by them. But they saw through the white imperialist scheme to gain a foothold in their country, and they bitterly contested imperialist encroachment. Douglass's mere presence as a show-case Negro, however, helped to pave the way for future penetration of American imperialism and gave it a cover of prestige and inoffensiveness when in reality it was a deadly cancer that threatened to eat away at the freedoms of all colonial peoples of the world. Douglass's mere presence in the imperialist camp helped fool many young black men to serve in the American army against their own black brothers and cousins abroad. Yet Douglass enthusiastically went along with this role of showcase Negro and in his autobiography actually brags about his part in helping to expand American influence.

John Hope Franklin evaluated Douglass's role and the role of other token Negroes for imperialism as follows: "From the end of reconstruction down to the beginning of World War I, ministers to Haiti were largely Negroes and they manifested a keen interest in the extension of American influence."¹⁴ Franklin also adds: "To the extent that these Negro representatives of the American government sought to extend the economic influence of the United States in Haiti and Liberia they were enlarging the black empire of the United States."¹⁵

Yet Douglass was proud of his part in helping an unjust government spread its vicious, genocidal system to other op-

pressed black peoples of the world. He was proud of what he did to help open the way for American imperialism into the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, and Vietnam today. What had happened to this great man? What had happened to the young uncompromising fighter against injustice and tyranny?

The tragedy of the elder Douglass was that he sincerely believed in the new system that now dominated the land, and did his utmost to integrate into it. And worse, he used his tremendous gifts and vast influence to rally the black masses behind the Establishment and the American way of strife. He balked completely at alerting, mobilizing, and organizing them to fight the new oppressor. Instead, he advocated integrating and disintegrating into the very cancerous system that was now promoting the new system of exploitation and super-profits at home and abroad. Frederick Douglass did not see the new class divisions that emerged after the Civil War; he did not see that a system that enslaves its victim will not voluntarily free them or integrate with them; he did not or would not see that the new road to liberation again led through continual revolutionary struggle and not through disintegration, integration, or assimilation.

And more sadly, perhaps Douglass did not want to see these things; he was getting along in years; he had fought the long, courageous fight in the abolitionist movement; and he had accumulated wealth, fame, and even a white wife. According to boozie standards, he now "had it made," so why embark upon a new, dangerous crusade in the twilight years of his life?

He admitted that the new easy living coupled with his advancing years had made him unfit to wage vigorous struggle.¹⁶ Strangely, however, he always found the time and strength to campaign tenaciously and vigorously for the Republican Party as long as he personally benefited from it with petty appointments, honors, etc., despite that party's consistent, brazen sell-outs and betrayals of the Afro-Americans. Douglass let the new rulers try to silence the black masses' cry for justice with the crumbs of tokenism through a few appointments to Negro misleaders.

And it is even sadder to recall that Douglass became such an avid integrationist in his twilight years that he discouraged

the black masses from independent organizing politically, and instead voiced the weird idea that the solution to the race problem lay in complete assimilation of the blacks by the whites.¹⁷ The idea of blacks organizing alongside radical or progressive political groups like the Populists was complete anathema to him. Instead, he advocated the petty bourgeois idea that Afros must become swallowed up by and disappear into the polluted white mainstream of American life before we all could become truly and completely free.

The contradiction between his faith in the land of opportunism and its adamant refusal to free its black victims could only be restored by this fantasy because of Douglass's own black petty boozie beliefs and aspirations. He carried these extreme boozie, individualistic ideas of "work hard, save your money, be God-fearing, etc., and God and America will reward you in the end" with him to his grave.

He could not, would not, or did not care to see that the material base for the wealthy in this country had its origins in the murderous practice of using stolen labor upon stolen land. Seemingly, he could not see or did not care to see that his beloved capitalism was itself directly responsible for perpetrating racism, discrimination, and genocide upon himself and the black masses. Therefore he did not fight against the new oppressor or join with others to oppose it. And it is to Douglass's discredit and shame that he willingly became a tool in the hands of the main enemy of the black masses by letting himself become a token or show-case Negro for American imperialism.

We must, however, remember Douglass for his positive contributions to the struggle for human freedom. His ideas of struggle, organization, agitation, etc. are a positive legacy for the modern-day struggle against the enemies of mankind. But at the same time we must never forget the negative role he played in his later years, and we must roundly repudiate and sharply criticize his latter-day acts as disservices to the very struggle he fought so valiantly for in his early years. And we must never forget that in his later years he not only was working against the best interests of the black masses at home but against the interests of the oppressed abroad.

No people gain liberation by integrating with the oppres-

sor. Such an act can only lead to co-optation by the oppressor or to neo-colonialism. Any leader who preaches such a false doctrine does disservice to the Afro-American masses in particular and to the world-wide struggle for freedom in general.

This is the chief lesson to be learned from Frederick Douglass's role as "First Show-case Negro for American Imperialism."

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PERU

AN INTERVIEW WITH ANÍBAL QUIJANO

Q. The reformist program implemented by the Peruvian military regime completes its fourth year in October, 1972. What have been the effects of the program? Can it be said that, beyond all the rhetoric and publicity, this reform program has had important effects in the economic and political sphere? If so, what are the program's most relevant effects?

A. During its first period, which ran approximately from October 1968 to mid-1971, the military government's role was that of a pretentious arbitrator between conflicting classes. The government enacted measures of a multi-class nature, oriented toward a limited, ineffective form of nationalism. More and more, the military regime has been revealing its actual class content, to the point where this year it is openly coordinating its policies with the most advanced sectors of the native bourgeoisie and the advisory groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The most important measures in the economic sector this year

This interview, originally published as "Perú, a cuatro años de un proyecto de reforma," in *Siempre* (Mexico City), November 8, 1972, will serve to bring up to date the analysis of developments in Peru contained in Aníbal Quijano, *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neocolonialism*, originally published as the special July-August 1971 issue of MR and subsequently as an MR Press book. It was translated from the Spanish by James D. Cockcroft and Ruben Berrios. The interviewers, Rolando Cordera and Salvador Hernández, are prominent younger voices on the Mexican Left. Cockcroft is co-author with Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson of *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (New York: Anchor, 1972; Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A., 1972); Berrios is a graduate student in sociology at Rutgers University.

are definitely of bourgeois content, which explains the increasing agreements with imperialist investment and finance, as well as the stepped-up repression against popular sectors.

As far as Peruvian society is concerned, the military regime has achieved three important reforms: agrarian reform; reform of the capitalist enterprise; and educational reform. Starting this year, new steps have been taken to carry out a fourth reform: reform of the state.

Objectively, of all the reforms, the agrarian reform has the greatest depth. It implies elimination of the power bases of the moribund oligarchic bourgeoisie, socio-economic and ideological homogenization of the native bourgeoisie centered in the urban-industrial sectors, and modification of the relations which agricultural workers have with the rest of the ruling class.

The reform of the capitalist enterprise consists in the creation of "workers' communities" in the industrial, mining, and fishing sectors. These "communities" allow limited workers' participation in stock ownership and, as shareholders, in administrative decision-making—under norms appropriate to a capitalist regime. The explicit aim is to strengthen capitalist enterprises by reinvesting profits based on increased worker productivity. An effort is being made to persuade workers that their interests are now identical with those of the capitalists and thus, ingeniously, to put to sleep their class consciousness and to avoid any true proletarian pressures in the short or long run.

The reform in education, which has barely started, seeks to find a way out of the system's educational crisis by modernizing its content and teaching methods, and by educating students according to the ideological and professional requirements of this new capitalist structure. Also, the educational reform is systematizing relations between various levels of the educational apparatus.

The reform of the state is an attempt to impose a corporate system. It implies the splitting up of social classes and their subsequent vertical regroupment in multi-class organizations, in which the exploited and the exploiters are "integrated" in every area of economic and administrative activity. These organizations are arbitrarily placed under the state, which in this way seeks to obtain complete control over workers' organizations.

The bourgeoisie have no problems, since they are in, and with, the state. It is the exploited classes—above all, the proletariat—that are prevented from organizing and developing autonomously against the bourgeoisie and the state. For these purposes the military regime has created an apparatus called SINAMOS (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*—National System of Support for Social Mobilization). SINAMOS is an ideological cover for alleging a “fully participatory democracy,” which rejects any need for political parties, since in fact the military tends to act as the *only* party. The military uses SINAMOS, a state entity, as its arm for manipulating the masses.

With respect to relations with the imperialist bourgeoisie, the military regime has tried to eliminate the “enclave” model under which foreign investment previously operated and by means of which the Peruvian economy had assumed a semi-colonial character. The military is replacing the old model with a new system of association between the monopolist-international bourgeoisie and the national-dependent state; the native bourgeoisie is to submit itself to this new arrangement. Thus, Peru’s military regime is achieving an important modification in the country’s position in the imperialist chain. Under the new forms of association with the state, foreign investment is increasing, even as the international financial system is expanding its capitalist credits and lending facilities in favor of the military regime. It is interesting to point out that this is happening at the very moment when the imperialist bourgeoisie and its financial apparatus are openly blockading and attacking the international trade of the Popular Unity government of Chile.

As a whole, the reformist measures of the military regime are laying the basis for a new capitalist structure in Peru. This structure is characterized by a reduction of precapitalist relations of production, the expansion of modern forms of capitalism, broadening of the area of state capitalism, incorporation of neocapitalist elements in relations between entrepreneurs and workers, elimination of the “enclave” in imperialist domination, and strict association between state capital and international capital.

Q. People say that the development of this new military

regime divided and confused Peru's Marxist Left. How was such a crisis manifested? What has been the evolution of the Left in these four years?

A. To understand the present situation of Peru's Marxist Left, it is necessary to recall that after the death of José Carlos Mariátegui in 1930, neither Marxism nor the political organizations that claimed to be Marxist developed significantly. Only in the course of the last decade has this movement—slowly and with great difficulty—begun to strengthen itself.

The Communist Party was small and led a precarious existence, while the Trotskyist groups were even more incohesive and reduced. Under the impact of the Cuban Revolution, a sector of the student movement became radicalized, and nuclei of intellectuals oriented toward Marxism developed, resulting in the formation of new political organizations of Castroist persuasion, like MIR (*Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*—Army of National Liberation). MIR and ELN soon launched guerrilla warfare and were defeated in action. There also formed at this time VR (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria*—Revolutionary Vanguard), an organization with autonomist intentions vis-à-vis whatever orientations were coming from the USSR, China, or Cuba. VR failed to coordinate an effective or cohesive political project. For their part, some Trotskyist groups clustered under the leadership of Hugo Blanco between 1957 and 1964, creating FIR (*Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Revolutionary Left Front, now an official affiliate of the Fourth International) and supporting the organization and mobilization of peasants in the southern highlands. Repression of peasants and the imprisonment of Blanco broke up that movement. The Sino-Soviet split produced a division in the Communist Party of Peru and the formation of various pro-Chinese youth and student groups without any well defined political programs.

When the military coup of October 1968 occurred, the Marxist Left was in a formative period and was looking at various options offered by political developments of that time, mainly derived from Castroist, Soviet, Maoist, and Trotskyist influences. The defeat of MIR and ELN had already complete-

ly debilitated the Castroist influence in the Peruvian Left; at the same time, the main pro-Chinese faction divided into two wings, and the Trotskyist movement displayed here all its many tendencies.

Thus, the Marxist Left's weakness in Peru was obvious with respect to its conceptions, its barely initiated investigation of Peruvian reality, its incipient organization, its limited presence among the urban working class. The Left had established itself primarily among university students, a few sectors of the peasantry, and to a lesser extent the industrial proletariat.

It would have been unrealistic to expect that, under such conditions, Peru's Marxist Left would be capable of analyzing successfully from the very beginning the arbitrary actions and multi-class measures of the new military regime. Without a doubt, confusion was the main result in theory, and vacillation between reformist opportunism and dogmatic sectarianism were its sequels in action. Those who accuse Peru's socialist Left of these defects should remember that the entire Latin American and international Left showed the same weaknesses in understanding this military regime. In Peru this confusion has already ended, and vacillation in action is now ending; the same cannot be said for the Left outside of Peru.

Having survived a period of confusion and vacillation which produced various splits in the heart of its organizations, Peru's revolutionary Left is currently undergoing redefinition and maturation. Fundamentally, this process is expressed by: (1) a growing, strengthened Marxist investigation of Peruvian and international reality, which develops Marxist thought and methodology in the country and lays the basis in concepts and ideas for a real political discussion—no longer purely ideological—about problems of class struggle and the revolutionary socialist movement in Peru; (2) a vigorous and genuine effort to move away from dogmatism and sectarianism, to become autonomous in thought and practice from the main international centers of influence and control over the Left; (3) a weakening of all positions and action styles not organically linked to the political development of the masses of workers, and an effort to widen and consolidate connections with workers, to contribute to their political education and the development of their class conscious-

ness from the base itself, by abandoning the bureaucratic style inherited from the Aprista and Stalinist periods.

Q. In some Latin American countries there seems to be taking place a profound re-examination of tactics and strategy on the revolutionary Left, a reformulation which aims at criticizing the guerrilla *foco* theory and which we might term "a return to Lenin." What do you think of such a process in Peru?

A. To be sure, within and outside of Latin America, but especially here, the still unfinished evaluation of this past decade's experience obliges the Left to undertake a profound and energetic reformulation of its strategic and tactical alternatives. In general, the revolutionary movement in Latin American countries in the last decade was heavily influenced by Castroism, with its empiricist and voluntarist tendencies. Especially influential was Castro's polemic against reformism. Sociologically speaking, the focus of those movements was, for the most part, the radicalized petty bourgeoisie. Effective participation of masses of workers was limited.

In addition to the Cuban Revolution, Castroism made a fundamental contribution to Latin America: the rupture of the socio-psychological and ideological (not so much theoretical) bases of reformism and bureaucratism traditional to left movements. Castroism for the first time placed before the masses and revolutionaries the concrete problem of power and, with its victorious example, unleashed imagination and action toward that objective. Nevertheless, the empiricism and voluntarism that were Castroism's dominant characteristics did not permit its actions to fuse with the political development of the masses and did not stimulate reorganization of specific theory around the course of class struggle and of modifications in the structure of contemporary capitalism and imperialism. But under the influence of Castroism, there have been some important tactical innovations, including in some cases new modes of mass mobilization. Criticism and assimilation of the experience of that period must salvage all those possibilities and not merely free us from its simplistic plans of action.

For that very same reason, a possible "return to Lenin" cannot signify mere uncritical acceptance of each concrete proposition made by Lenin with respect to organization, action styles,

or mechanisms of mobilization and political education. The Latin American revolution has, in each country and as a whole, its own rich historical experience, whose critical assimilation and maturation must constitute the real basis of revolutionary development in the next period. To be valid, the "return to Lenin" can only be an assimilation of Leninism's methods of analysis and formulation of action alternatives, of its firm vigilance over the specific historical process, of the class character of every measure, of its theoretical inflexibility when it comes to the pivotal role of the proletariat. This must be combined with Leninism's capacity for tactical flexibility based on an effective analysis of the course of class struggle and a permanent action style maintained on the terrain of the masses, with faith in them, against all the temptations of voluntarism to supersede the masses—but steeled with a determination to seek power for the workers and not the crumbs of bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, or worker reformism.

That is also why it is not enough to study *What Is To Be Done?* and to discuss abstractly the formal virtues of the model proposed there. A profound study of the real history of the party and the struggle of the Bolsheviks, as well as of the contemporary experience of building revolutionary movements within and outside of Latin America, is now indispensable. Certainly Lenin found the proper road for building the party and class struggle by concretely studying the historical circumstances of each day in the class struggle of Russia and Europe, and not inversely by applying an abstract model constructed outside of concrete reality. The substantial changes in Lenin's own ideas after the 1905 revolution constitute the supreme example of this methodology.

Q. What are the prospects for Peru's military reformism, and what are those of the Left?

A. At the very time the military regime has been revealing its class content by each day striving harder to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, the most advanced sectors of the miners and urban-industrial workers have been strengthening their resistance to corporatism, to the ideology of class conciliation, and to concessions to imperialist investment. They have pressured their own trade unions and political organizations of socialist-reformist bent, such as the Communist Party and the General

Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) which it controls, to such a point that these organizations' leaders were forced at the 1972 National Conference of the CGTP publicly to condemn the "anti-labor and anti-worker" actions of SINAMOS and the stepped-up repression against workers who fought for salary adjustments.

Entering its fifth year, Peru's military government finds itself in a difficult economic situation. The total paralysis of the fishmeal industry, for reasons still not well understood, signifies not only the laying off of tens of thousands of workers but also a decline in foreign exchange earnings and growing problems for the nation's trade balance. Inflationary pressure is now very evident, and the corresponding decrease in the real wages of workers has become most clear to them. A deficit in agriculture this year resulting from bad weather will necessitate the importation of food products precisely at a time when the fishing crisis is causing foreign exchange holdings to drop.

Under these conditions, the military regime has to increase its concessions to and deals with imperialist capital, and at the same time seek to maintain social peace. But obviously such social peace cannot be maintained merely by an appeal to legitimacy won by reform measures already accomplished, because the workers cannot now afford to stop applying pressure for needed wage adjustments to defend the real value of their labor power.

That is why the government is trying to speed up SINAMOS's penetration of the labor unions, to let the state use its manipulative resources to take over the unions and, in the face of the growing resistance of the masses against this policy, to escalate repression against striking unions and the student movement. Since the Cobriza massacre last year, the repression against the teachers' strike that same year, and the deportation of its leaders and of Hugo Blanco, the government has unleashed its repression this year with the massacre of the people of Puno; the violent police invasion of the Agrarian University where workers, students, and professors had formulated an alternative to run the university properly; the banning of the recent teachers' strike and the imprisonment of its leaders; the violent police repression of numerous striking workers'

organizations in Lima; etc. These facts have been denounced publicly not only by numerous labor unions throughout the country but also by the Communist Party and the CGTP, organizations which support the military regime.

This deepening conflict between the workers and the military regime signals the evolution of the Peruvian process now under way: corporatist policies accompanied by stepped-up repression, the basic tendency of this regime as its own radical reformist sectors weaken.

In the face of all this, the revolutionary socialist Left has concrete tasks which are now in the course of development. These tasks are: to strengthen the ability to criticize; to mobilize and organize all workers and popular sectors; to defend class autonomy of trade unions and political organizations against brutal corporatism; to defend real wages in the face of the increasing rate of inflation; to struggle against the increasing concessions offered to imperialist capital; and to develop the struggle for revolutionary nationalizations of all foreign enterprises.

In the long run, it is a matter of building a vast, vigorous, popular movement under the political leadership of the proletariat and affirmed by workers' actions and the political development of the masses, struggling at the same time against reformist opportunism and dogmatic sectarianism within the mass movement.

Defenders of the reformist-corporate military regime are trying to impose an ideological terror, arguing not only that this is an anti-capitalist revolution but also that it is the sole possible revolution, which therefore must be supported. This kind of cynicism has reached such an extreme that some official propagandists maintain that Peru is already a socialist society, most probably to degrade the very word "socialism" in the eyes of the masses. But history is hard and implacable and will judge at the appropriate time the lackeys of military reformism and the ineffable ideologues of class conciliation who go so far as to believe, in their own unique style, that they are making an historical discovery, while in fact they pave the way to corporatism and repression against workers and revolutionaries who refuse to abandon the terrain of the masses for a well-paid bureaucratic post in the military regime.

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Tanzer, Michael	<i>The Sick Society</i>	6	42

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and renewed memberships) for the month February 15-March 15 was up by 25 percent compared to the previous month (January 15-February 15). The absolute amount involved is of course not large enough to solve the problem, but it does engender a cautious optimism about the prospects for the next few months. With subscription and single-copy prices going up as of the first of May, regular income should soon begin to rise and the deficit—which has long been going up because of increased costs—should begin to fall. If Associates income also continues to come in at or near present levels, the possibility of reaching a satisfactory balance would seem to be a good deal nearer at hand than we dared hope only a couple of months ago. In the meantime, it will be helpful to us and economical for you if you renew your subscription (sub blank on p. 27).

The February 5th issue of *Publishers Weekly* (the trade journal of the book publishing industry) contains figures on book prices in 1972. The categories which correspond to most MR Press books are "History" and "Sociology, Economics." Here are average 1972 prices for books in these categories:

	<i>Hardcover</i>	<i>Paperback</i>
History	\$14.92	\$3.58
Sociology, Economics	16.93	4.11

By comparison, the average price of MR Press hardcover books published in 1972 (29 titles) was \$8.61 and of paperbacks (31 titles) \$3.23. When it is further considered that MRP books include proportionately many more high-cost translations than is the case for the trade in general, it will be seen that MRP prices are well below average. Not that we wouldn't like to see them still lower, for we realize that even MRP prices are prohibitive for many readers. We do, however, offer a partial solution for those who buy a considerable number of new books in the course of a year, and that is to join the Associates and buy your personal copies at 50 percent off list price. The savings on a \$10 book are thus \$5, and one has to buy only five of them to make up the entire MR Associates minimum membership fee (which covers an additional year's sub to MR).

At a time like this, when the Left is facing new problems, it behooves all of us to ask ourselves what we are trying to accomplish and whether we are going about it in an appropriate way. As far as MR is concerned we found helpful in this regard a letter received the other day from a subscriber explaining why he was for the first time joining the Associates. Describing himself as "an average movement person" who has been active in political work for several years and has now settled down in a working-class community, the writer continues:

I don't know what the real opportunities for work here are. Although I've been working various jobs for two years, no clear-cut opportunity for sustained political work has emerged. I feel that some time such an opportunity will present itself, and until then we can just do the agitational work that we can. In this context MR is an invaluable magazine. . . . MR certainly helps me and the people I work with to do better political work.

Our correspondent has described precisely what we are trying to do: give movement people, regardless of their particular affiliations, the kind of information they need in a form they can use "to do better political work." We'd like to hear more from readers about how they think we could improve this service.

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